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  Today, most of the advanced economies—Australia, Canada, Japan, the euro area, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States—allow market forces to 
determine their exchange rates.  Policy makers in these economies understand that if they want to 
focus their monetary policies on independently determined domestic objectives—low inflation 
and growth at potential—and continue to enjoy the substantial benefit of free cross-border 
financial flows, then they must, by and large, allow their exchange rates to float.   
  Nevertheless, these same monetary authorities realize that from time-to-time, the 
normally smooth functioning of exchange markets can become impaired, and they maintain the 
capacity to influence key nominal exchange rates.  Usually, they do so through official purchases 
or sales of foreign exchange.  The effectiveness, the limitations, and the costs of these policies, 
however, remain the subject of an on-going debate.  Over the last fifteen years or so, reflecting 
the tenor of this debate, the monetary authorities in most of the large advanced economies have 
come to regard foreign-exchange-market intervention as a tool that that they should deploy 
sparingly, if at all.   
  This has not always been the prevailing view.  Throughout most of the twentieth century, 
monetary authorities considered exchange-rate stability an important—sometimes almost the 
sole—objective of monetary policy.  Even after the adoption of generalized floating in 1973, 
policy makers hoped that foreign-exchange-market intervention offered a means of influencing 
exchange rates independent of their monetary policies.  Traditional instruments of monetary 
policy, they hoped, could focus on price stability or growth at potential, while intervention could 
influence the path of key exchange rates.  This view was never constant; it seldom went 
unchallenged, and it ultimately proved wrong.   
This book explores the evolution of exchange-market policy—primarily foreign-
exchange intervention—in the United States.  It is fundamentally a study of institutional learning 
and adaptation under regime change since the abandonment of the classical gold standard.  As 
such, this study explains the economic developments, the political environment, and the 
bureaucratic issues that nurtured those changes.  Although we refer to many of the econometric 
studies of foreign-exchange-market intervention, ours is not a survey of the voluminous 
literature.
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We observe this evolutionary process primarily through the lens of Federal Reserve 
documents and a unique data set consisting of all official U.S. foreign-exchange transactions 
executed through the Foreign Exchange Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York between 
1961 and 1997.  Although we discuss operations of the U.S. Treasury, particularly as they 
dovetail with the System’s policies, we lacked detailed documentation of Treasury attitudes 
about intervention.  Hence the scope of our analysis is somewhat restricted to the Federal 
Reserve.  We also refer to other advanced countries in our narrative, but, again, we only consider 
them in so far as they relate to U.S. policies.  For the most part, we do not discuss how foreign 
governments formulated policies in an open economy.     
  While we introduce some empirical analysis, ours is primarily an historical narrative.     
This introductory chapter starts with an overview of the major theme of this book:  
Attitudes about foreign-exchange intervention and monetary policy have come to embrace a 
monetary policy focused on price stability, freely floating exchange rates, and global openness.   
It then discusses the economics of exchange-market intervention, offers an interpretation of 
existing empirical research, and provides an overview of the institutional arrangements for 2 
 
intervention in the United States.  In subsequent chapters, our historical narrative explores all of 
the topics mentioned here in much greater detail.  The final section of this introduction offers a 
road map to the subsequent chapters.   
Monetary-Policy Evolution and the Development of Foreign-Exchange-Market Intervention  
  The same evolutionary process that forged modern views about monetary policy has 
shaped contemporary attitudes about foreign-exchange-market intervention.   Over the past 
century, monetary authorities have grappled with the basic problem of having more economic 
policy objectives than independent instrument with which to attain them.  Standard monetary-
policy tools function in the first instance by affecting bank reserves or the ability of banks to use 
those reserves.  In the face of repeated and various economic shocks, this single instrument—
changes in the amount and use of bank reserves—cannot continuously maintain fixed exchange 
rates and an independent inflation objective without also restricting financial flows.  This is the 
well known trilemma of international finance.
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  This same evolutionary force, however, ultimately curtailed the use of foreign-exchange 
intervention in most of the large developed economies.  Eventually, monetary authorities saw a 
credible commitment to price stability as the key contribution that central banks can make to 
maintaining economic growth at potential and to fostering exchange-rate stability.  To be 
effective, however, monetary policy must be credible, and foreign-exchange intervention—even 
interventions that leave the money stock unaltered—can threaten the credibility of monetary 
policy.  This is especially true for a central bank, like the Federal Reserve, that operates without 
a legislative mandate for price stability and is subservient in its intervention operations to fiscal 
authorities (Broaddus and Goodfriend 1996).   
  Foreign-exchange intervention, as practiced 
today, resulted from attempts to find an additional instrument with which to affect exchange 
rates while allowing monetary authorities to set independent domestic inflation objectives 
without sacrificing the gains from unfettered cross-border financial flows.  Intervention 
ultimately was an attempt to solve the trilemma.   
Intervention—the key focus of this book—refers to official purchases and sales of foreign 
exchange that monetary officials undertake to influence exchange rates.  This definition 
describes intervention in terms of a type of transaction and a motive guiding that transaction.  
The distinction among various types of transactions is important because countries have many 
policy levers through which to affect the exchange value of their currencies.  This broader set of 
operations constitutes exchange-rate policy, of which intervention is a subset, and it includes 
such other things as commercial policies, restraints of financial flows, or even monetary-policy 
actions.  An understanding of the motive for buying and selling foreign exchange is also a 
necessary component of the definition of intervention because governments often transact in 
foreign exchange for purposes other than altering their exchange rates.  Central banks sometimes 
buy or sell foreign exchange to manage the currency composition of their reserve portfolios, or to 
undertake transactions for customers, such as their own fiscal authorities and other monetary 
authorities, or even to conduct monetary policy.  While these transactions may well affect 
exchange rates, this is not their purpose, and, hence, they do not constitute intervention.
3
  Intervention, and exchange-rate policies more broadly, derive from a desire to limit 
exchange-rate variability—a policy objective that the classical gold standard most completely 
reached.  Under the classical gold standard (1880 – 1914) countries did not maintain domestic 
monetary-policy objectives as such; they effectively focused on maintaining a fixed exchange 
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rate.  Countries set an official price of gold and promised to buy and sell unlimited quantities of 
gold to maintain that price.  They also allowed individuals to freely import and export gold.  
Exchange rates were derivatives of official gold prices and were contained within gold export 
and import points, which the cost of arbitrage in gold determined.  Forms of money other than 
gold coins, such as bank notes and national currencies, circulated but were ultimately convertible 
into gold.  In this way, the gold standard limited monetary authorities’ discretion and thereby 
anchored expectations about the long-run internal and external value of money.  The classical 
gold standard solved the trilemma at the expense of domestic monetary-policy independence.   
The gold standard, however, did not completely eliminate discretion to protect the 
domestic economy and banking sector from potential gold flows.  Central banks could operate 
with some latitude within the gold points.  They could, for example, alter the ratio of gold 
reserves to currency or their discount rates.  At the gold points, central banks were generally 
expected to reinforce the domestic monetary effects of gold flows through their discount policies.  
Often, however, countries attempted to offset the monetary effects of gold flows.  Some resorted 
to gold devices—policies to effectively alter the gold points—such as impediments to the export 
or import of gold.  These operations at the gold points served to soften the trilemma’s 
constraints.  Some banks acquired foreign exchange reserves and intervened both to smooth 
exchange-rate fluctuation and to keep exchange rates within the gold points.  Still, maintaining 
the official gold price and fixed exchange rates with free cross-border financial flows was 
sacrosanct.   
  The classical gold standard collapsed at the on-set of World War I, along with the view 
that monetary policy should focus on maintaining a fixed exchange rate to the near-complete 
exclusion of domestic-policy objectives.  To be sure, the gold exchange standard (1925 – 1931) 
remained a strong commitment to fixed exchange rates, but not one for which countries would 
long sacrifice internal economic conditions.  When necessary, countries sterilized gold flows and 
erected trade barriers.  They sought to solve the trilemma in favor of domestic independence and 
exchange-rate stability.  Countries also intervened in foreign-currency markets.  After the 
interwar gold standard collapsed during the Great Depression, the United Kingdom established 
the Exchange Equalization Fund (1932) and the United States followed with its own Exchange 
Stabilization Fund (1934).  Both funds sought to promote exchange-rate stability through 
interventions in the gold and foreign-exchange markets.  Both were attempts to provide policy 
makers with an additional instrument to meet their expanding set of objectives.   
  The disconnection between monetary policy and adherence to an official gold price, 
which started as the classical gold standard collapsed, progressed through the Bretton Woods era.  
The Federal Reserve System—the dominant central bank under Bretton Woods—focused 
monetary policy almost exclusively on domestic economic objectives, notably full employment 
or growth at potential.  Other countries bore the burden of intervening to defend their currencies.  
Constraints on financial flows often proliferated.  By 1960, the trilemma was beginning to 
overwhelm the Bretton Woods system.  The U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve System set 
up credit lines to provide temporary cover for foreign central banks’ dollar exposures and to help 
deficit countries fund their interventions.  Sometimes the United States intervened directly in 
exchange markets.  The System, however, never let its exchange-market operations interfere 
with its domestic-policy objectives.  Although these mechanisms may have lengthened Bretton 
Woods, the system collapsed because neither the Federal Reserve nor other central banks would 
subvert domestic economic conditions to the rigors of maintaining fixed exchange rates.   4 
 
  Although Bretton Woods imposed few, if any, constraints on the Federal Reserve, U.S. 
monetary policy, nevertheless, failed to attain its domestic policy objectives during the late 
1960s and the 1970s.  By the late 1970s, inflation in the United States reached double-digit levels 
through a combination of bad economic theory, poor measurement, and at times political 
pressure.  The Federal Reserve’s commitment to low inflation had lost credibility.  People no 
longer believed that the Federal Reserve would continue to accept the real output and 
employment costs of eliminating inflation.  Inflation expectations became imbedded in economic 
decisions with adverse consequences for potential growth.  The near crisis atmosphere that 
emerged in the late 1970s prompted a dramatic change in monetary policy under Chairman 
Volcker.  The Federal Reserve, thereafter, embarked on a long process of rebuilding its 
credibility.  Monetary policy increasingly focused on an inflation objective, and the FOMC 
eventually accepted that low and stable inflation expectations were necessary for maintaining the 
economy’s growth at potential.   
A similar learning process occurred with respect to foreign-exchange operations after the 
collapse of Bretton Woods.  Monetary authorities reluctantly accepted floating exchange rates, 
and despite their desire for a greater degree of policy independence, they initially feared giving 
exchange rates free reign.  Policy makers believed that foreign-exchange-market inefficiencies 
created unnecessary volatility and caused rates to deviate from fundamental values.  
Intervention—particularly on the part of the United States—was necessary to provide guidance 
and to calm market disorder.  Moreover, the early-on predominant explanation for the 
effectiveness of sterilized intervention—the portfolio-balance channel—supported exchange-
market activism by suggesting that intervention solved the instrument-versus-objectives problem.  
In this view, monetary policy could focus on domestic objectives, and intervention could manage 
exchange rates.   
Views about exchange-market efficiency changed more slowly than attitudes about 
intervention.  By the early 1980s, policymakers in the United States were questioning whether 
sterilized intervention did indeed provide a means of systematically affecting exchange rates 
independent of monetary policy.  Reflecting this uncertainty, the United States, from 1981 
through 1985, adopted a minimalist approach to exchange-market operations, but as the dollar 
dramatically appreciated under a mix of tight monetary and loose fiscal policies and seemed to 
over-shoot a value consistent with fundamentals, pressure for intervention reemerged.  The Plaza 
and Louvre Accords were attempts to re-emphasize exchange rates as objectives of policy.  
Unfortunately, the now prevailing view of intervention—that it signaled future monetary-policy 
changes—left advocates of coordinated exchange-market operations short one policy instrument.   
That intervention did not solve the trilemma was one thing; that it made the situation 
worse was something altogether intolerable.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as the System 
worked to strengthen its policy credibility, the thrust of foreign-exchange intervention—now 
usually undertaken at the Treasury’s behest—often conflicted with the motivation for monetary 
policy.  The FOMC believed that such interventions created uncertainty about its commitment to 
price stability.  Moreover, the committee feared that the related institutional connections between 
the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve—chiefly swap lines and warehousing privileges—
also threatened the System’s independence and, therefore, its credibility.  These concerns—not 
questions about intervention’s effectiveness—curtailed the operations.  By the late 1990s, central 
banks in the advanced economies accepted that a commitment of price stability also removed 
uncertainty about monetary policy as a source of volatility in foreign-exchange markets.  The 5 
 
large developed economies solved the trilemma in favor of monetary policy independence, 
floating exchange rates, and free cross-border financial flows.   
Nevertheless, the large developed economies have not completely forsaken foreign 
exchange-market intervention.   While policy makers generally view foreign-exchange markets 
as highly efficient, they still see the market as prone to occasional bouts of disorder.   One might 
dismiss intervention as an independent instrument with which to routinely—or frequently—
manage exchange rates, but one cannot deny that intervention sometimes may be effective.   
 Intervention as Distinct from Monetary Policy 
  Economists have offered two broad channels through which intervention, as distinct from 
monetary policy, might affect exchange rates.  Each channel has different implications for what 
intervention might achieve and how it should be conducted.  To understand these channels one 
must first understand the important distinction between sterilized and non-sterilized intervention, 
since only the former could possibly give monetary authorities an additional instrument with 
which to pursue an exchange-rate objective independent of their monetary policy.   
  When a central bank buys or sells foreign exchange, it typically makes or accepts 
payment in domestic currency by crediting or debiting the reserve accounts of the appropriate 
commercial banks.  Except for the instruments involved, the mechanics of the transactions are 
similar to those of an open-market operation, and like an open-market operation, foreign 
exchange interventions have the potential to drain or add bank reserves.   
Central banks in large developed economies typically offset, or sterilize, any unwanted 
impacts from their foreign-exchange interventions on bank reserves (see Lecourt and Raymond 
2003 and Neely 2001, 2007).  They can do so through offsetting open-market operations.  Any 
central bank that conducts its monetary policy through an interest-rate or reserve-aggregate 
target—as many usually do—will automatically offset all transactions, including foreign-
exchange interventions, that threaten the attainment of its operating target.   
Sterilization prevents foreign-exchange transactions from interfering with the domestic 
objectives of monetary policy.  The potential for conflict between the two depends on the nature 
of the underlying disturbance to the exchange market.  In general, only if the underlying 
disturbance is domestic in origin and monetary in nature, will pursuing an exchange-rate 
objective through non-sterilized foreign intervention not conflict with a central bank’s inflation 
objective.  A central bank, for example, whose currency appreciates in the face of a domestic 
deflation, can prevent both a deflation and a currency appreciation through faster money growth.  
If the underlying shock is either foreign, or domestic and real, a non-sterilized intervention will 
inevitably interfere with a central bank’s inflation objective (Craig and Humpage 2003, Bordo 
and Schwartz 1989).   
Sterilization is also important in countries whose central banks are independent, but 
whose fiscal authorities maintain primary responsibility for intervention, because in the absence 
of sterilization, the fiscal authorities would maintain some direct control over monetary policy.  
In Japan, for example, the Ministry of Finance maintains authority for foreign-exchange 
intervention, and the, otherwise independent, Bank of Japan acts as its agent.  A similar 
relationship exits in the United States where the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve share 
responsibility for intervention.  If these central banks did not routinely sterilize foreign-exchange 6 
 
operations, their independence and the credibility of their monetary policies might come under 
question and that could adversely skew any short-term inflation-output tradeoff.   
To be sure, central banks sometimes factor nominal exchange-rate objectives into their 
monetary-policy decisions.  The Federal Reserve, for example, has occasionally altered its 
federal-funds-rate target while undertaking compatible foreign-exchange operations.  One might 
expect that implementing the appropriate monetary policy change through the purchase or sale of 
foreign currency could have a bigger impact on the exchange rate than implementing the move 
through open-market operations in government securities, and thereby justify official unsterilized 
foreign-exchange operations.  Bonser-Neal et al. (1998) and Humpage (1999) show that U.S. 
interventions undertaken in conjunction with changes in the federal funds rate have no apparent 
effect on exchange rates; both studies attribute observed exchange-rate responses solely to the 
federal funds rate.   
As a general rule, central banks have little to gain from non-sterilized foreign exchange-
market interventions.
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2.  Theoretical Underpinnings.   
  They can conflict with domestic monetary-policy objectives, and even 
when that is not the case, they seem completely redundant to open-market operations in domestic 
securities.  Sterilized intervention, on the other hand, holds open the prospect of providing 
central banks with the means of affecting exchange rates independent of their domestic monetary 
policy objectives.  How sterilized intervention might actually do this has been the focus of 
research over the last 30 years.   
  The asset-market approach to exchange-rate determination provides a useful framework 
for conceptualizing the channels through which sterilized intervention might influence exchange 
rates (see Dominguez 1992, Aguiler and Nydahl 2000).  The asset-market approach, which 
emphasizes the importance of expectations, describes current exchange rates in terms of existing 
fundamentals and expectations about their future paths.  Within this framework, sterilized 
intervention can affect current exchange rates if it alters fundamental determinants of exchange 
rates (other than the monetary base), if it affects expectations about these fundamentals, or if it 
impacts expectations not related to fundamentals.   
Portfolio-Balance Channel   
  Although sterilized intervention has no effect on the monetary base, it alters the currency 
composition of publically held government securities.  The associated rebalancing of private 
sector portfolios, however, offers central banks a potential channel through which to routinely 
and fundamentally affect exchange rates without interfering with their domestic monetary-policy 
objectives.  Economists refer to this as the portfolio-balance channel.   
  The act of sterilizing an intervention increases outstanding government securities 
denominated in the currency that central banks are selling relative to government securities 
denominated in the currency that central banks are buying.  If risk-averse asset holders view 
securities in different currency denominations as imperfect substitutes, they will only hold the 
relatively more abundant asset in their portfolios if the expected rate of return on that asset 
compensates them for the perceived risk of doing so.
5  Their initial reluctance to hold the 
relatively more abundant security forces a spot depreciation of the currency that central banks are 
selling relative to the currency that they are buying.  The spot depreciation relative to the 7 
 
exchange rate’s longer-term expected value then raises the anticipated rate of return on the now 
more-abundant securities and compensates asset holders for the perceived increase in risk.
6
  Unfortunately, most empirical studies find the relevant elasticities to be either statistically 
insignificant or quantitatively negligible (Edision 1993).  Central banks also do not put much 
stock in the portfolio balance channel (Neely 2007, p. 11).  Dominguez and Frankel (1993) is a 
notable, often-cited exception to the standard conclusion; they find a statistically and 
economically significant relationship.  The reason offered for the abscence of a portfolio effect is 
that the typical intervention transaction is miniscule relative to the stock of outstanding 
government assets.  If U.S. intervention operated prominently through a portfolio-balance 
channel, then intervention should exert a fairly robust influence on exchange rates across various 
time periods.  A number of papers find some connection between intervention and uncovered 
interest parity, but the relationship is not very robust across either time periods or currencies 
suggesting that the finding does not stem from a portfolio-balance effect (see, for example, 
Humpage and Osterberg 1992).   
   
Recently, proponents of the microstructure approach to exchange-rate determination have 
renewed interest in the portfolio-balance approach (Evans and Lyons 2001, Lyons 2001).  These 
models focus on the role of foreign-exchange dealers, who, as market makers, stand ready to buy 
and sell foreign exchange.  These same dealers typically do not hold sizable open positions in a 
foreign currency, especially overnight (Cheung and Chinn 2001).  They will try to distribute their 
unwanted currency holdings among other dealers and eventually among their commercial 
customers.  Since different currencies are not perfect substitutes in the dealers’ portfolio, this 
inventory-adjustment process resembles a portfolio-balance-like mechanism at the micro level.  
Evans and Lyons (2001, 2005) claim evidence of both temporary—dealer to dealer inventory 
reshuffling—and permanent—dealer to customer—portfolio-balance effects.  The permanent 
component of this model, however, is at odds with the macro literature.  The microstructure 
model measures only currency flows in the foreign-exchange market.  It does not account for the 
fact that the sterilization process leaves the total amount of bank reserves for each currency 
unchanged, while changing the relative stock of domestic and foreign-currency denominated 
government securities in the hands of the public.   
Expectations Channel  
Exchange markets are highly efficient processors of information, but not perfectly so.  If 
information is costly, at any point in time, market participants either will not have complete 
information or will not fully understand its implications.  In such cases, market exchange rates 
cannot continuously reflect all available information.   
The volume of foreign-exchange trading, estimated at approximately $4 trillion 
equivalent per day, seems large relative to the volume of cross-border commercial transactions 
(BIS 2010).  Approximately 80% of trades occur among traditional market-making dealers or 
between these dealers and other financial customers, rather than between dealers and non-
financial customers (BIS 2010).  Much of this seemingly excessive dealer trading undoubtedly 
results from heterogeneous information among market participants and is vital to price 
discovery.   
Survey evidence does indeed suggest that access to private information differentiates 
market participants (Cheung and Chinn 2001).  Large foreign-exchange players have better 
information derived from a broader customer base and market network, which gives them a 8 
 
keener insight about order flow and the activities of other trading banks.  In such a market, 
exchange rates perform a dual role of describing the terms of trade and of transferring this 
information.  In markets characterized by information asymmetries, however, non-fundamental 
forces like bandwagon effects, over-reaction to news, technical trading, and excessive 
speculation may affect short-term exchange-rate dynamics.  Any trader that others suspect of 
having superior information, including a monetary authority, could affect price if market 
participants observed his or her trades.   
Research into foreign exchange market intervention then is largely predicated on the 
assumption that monetary authorities possess a significant informational advantage over other 
market participants, and that intervention can serve as a conduit for transferring that information.   
Is this a reasonable assumption for any player—let alone a central bank—in a highly efficient 
market?  If so, is this advantage routine or episodic?   
  Mussa (1981) suggested that central banks might signal future, unanticipated changes in 
monetary policy through their sterilized interventions, with sales or purchases of foreign 
exchange implying, respectively, domestic monetary tightening or ease.  Such trades would have 
direct implications for future fundamentals, and forward-looking traders would immediately 
adjust their spot exchange-rate quotations.  Mussa suggested that such signals could be 
particularly potent—more so than a mere announcement of monetary-policy intentions—because 
the intervention gives monetary authorities open positions (i.e., exposures) in foreign currencies 
that would result in losses if they failed to validate their signal.  Reeves (1997) formalized 
Mussa’s approach and demonstrated that if the signal is not fully credible, or if the market does 
not use all available information, then the response of the exchange rate to intervention will be 
muted.  In Reeve’s model, the amount of intervention influences the market’s response.   
  When Mussa proposed this signaling effect, the Federal Reserve—and other central 
banks—had lost much of their integrity for price stability.  If, however, central banks are 
credible, signaling future monetary policy through intervention would seem unnecessary.  
Markets can easily anticipate the future monetary policies of credible central banks.  Carlson et. 
al. (1995) showed that federal-funds futures anticipated monetary-policy changes fairly 
accurately within a two-month horizon, while Fatum and Hutchinson (1999) found that 
intervention added noise to the federal-funds-futures market.  A credible central bank simply 
may not routinely have private information about its own future monetary policies.
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Even central banks with private information about monetary policy are not likely to 
actively employ intervention as a signal.  For one thing, when a central bank eventually validates 
its signals, the interventions are no longer sterilized.  Consequently, such intervention does not 
ultimately provide central banks with an independent influence over exchange rates, and, as we 
explained above, it can interfere with monetary-policy credibility.
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  Intervention, of course, may offer a passive signal of future monetary policy; that is, 
purchases and sales of foreign exchange may simply be correlated with a future easing or 
tightening in monetary policy, with no signal intended.  In this case, one might find episodic 
  Moreover, most large central 
banks do not intervene for profit, and although central banks do not like to sustain huge losses on 
their foreign-exchange portfolios, the fear of losses does not strongly motivate their near-term 
actions.  Finally, as noted above, in countries like Japan and the United States where intervention 
falls under the purview of the fiscal authorities, central banks could lose their independence if 
they altered monetary policy in response to the interventions of the fiscal authorities.   9 
 
evidence of signaling.  Specifically, when the original shock to the exchange market resulted 
from an excessive easing or tightening in monetary policy, intervention might predict future 
policy corrections.  One would then only find a consistent correlation between intervention and 
future changes in monetary policy if the underlying shock to the exchange rate was persistently 
associated with domestic monetary policies.  If the underlying shock to the exchange market was 
not of that type, one might not find evidence of signaling.  Kaminsky and Lewis (1996), who 
investigate the signaling hypothesis, finds that when consistent monetary policy supports 
intervention, exchange rates tend to respond in the expected direction, but when inconsistent 
monetary policy accompanies intervention, exchange rates tend to move in the opposite 
direction.  
The connection between intervention and compatible monetary policy highlights the 
essential ambiguity in the monetary-policy signaling story: If intervention only works when it is 
consistent with imminent monetary-policy changes, that implies that prior and current monetary 
policy created the exchange-rate disturbance in the first place.  Why then intervene?  Why not 
just alter monetary policy?  The usefulness would seem to depend on central-bank credibility.  
This narrow interpretation of signaling seems passé.   
  Monetary authorities often claim to intervene when they view current exchange rates as 
being inconsistent with market fundamentals defined more broadly than monetary-policy 
variables.  They have large research staffs that gather and interpret statistics on current economic 
conditions.  If central banks have useful private information about market fundamentals, 
providing that information to the market through intervention can alter market expectations.  
Battachary and Weller (1997) and Vitale (1999) present theoretical models in which central 
banks maintain an informational advantage and disseminate their information to the market.  
Popper and Montgomery (2001) provide a particularly interesting model in which a central bank 
aggregates the private information of individual traders and disseminates this information 
through intervention.  Central banks typically maintain an ongoing informational relationship 
with a select group of major banks (domestic and foreign) and use these banks as counterparties 
for their foreign exchange transactions.
9
Coordination
  In exchange for their exclusivity, these dealers provide 
the central banks with interpretations of general market conditions, perceived reasons for market 
movements, and order flows.  If monetary authorities routinely have better broad-based 
information than other market participants, as Popper and Montgomery (2001) argue, then their 
interventions should accurately predict future exchange-rate movements; that is, researchers 
should be able to uncover a statistically valid relationship between the two.   
10
In extreme cases of information imperfections, when a substantial portion of market 
participants base trades on extrapolations of past exchange-rate movements, exchange rates 
might remain misaligned vis-à-vis their fundamentals, even if the more-informed private traders 
believed that the current exchange rate is inappropriate in terms of economic fundamentals.  As 
Reitz and Taylor (2008, p. 57-59) explain if the exchange rate has moved beyond a range 
consistent with market fundamentals, those traders who base their recent trades on fundamental 
analysis may have suffered recent losses, and drained their liquidity.  If so, they may have lost 
confidence in their judgment and their credibility with their managers.  This can deter them from 
trading on fundamentals, even though each knows that if they acted in concert, the exchange rate 
would return to a level consistent with market fundamentals.  The misalignment persists.   
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In such a situation, a central bank could intervene openly and offer a coordinating signal 
to those traders that react to fundamentals.  This signal bolsters those traders’ confidence about 
their exchange rate expectations and encourages them to take positions in the market.  Monetary 
authorities need not have better information than the private sector to provide a coordination 
role, but they must be able to take a long-term position without fear of incurring temporary 
losses (Reitz and Taylor 2008 p. 58).  As noted, central banks do not intervene for profits.   
The coordination channel is distinct from the signaling channel because it does not 
require that the central bank necessarily have better information than the market.  It does, like the 
signaling channel, seem to require that the monetary authorities lack credibility.  A credible 
central bank could simply announce that the exchange rates is misaligned, and get a reaction 
from the market.  A central bank lacking credibility may need to “put its money where its mouth 
is.” (Reitz and Taylor 2008 p. 59)   
Does Intervention Work? 
  Over the years, empirical research on the effectiveness of sterilized intervention has 
grown sharply.  The myriad studies are almost all empirical, and they incorporate a broad range 
of experimental strategies and techniques.  The results clearly demonstrate a high frequency—
daily or intra-daily connection—between foreign-exchange-market intervention and exchange 
rates.  The results, however, are not robust across currencies, time periods, and empirical 
techniques.  Intervention often seems more like a hit-or-miss proposition than a sure thing.
11
Even though most empirical studies do not provide a fully articulated theoretical model 
of intervention, economists typically interpret the results from such studies as evidence of a 
broad expectations or a coordination channel.  We do not know much about the duration of these 
effects, but given the near martingale nature of exchange-rate changes, it seems reasonable to 
interpret them as highly persistent, if not permanent.  A successful sterilized intervention would 
seem to set an exchange rate off along an alternative path, but one that is still consistent with pre-
existing, unaltered fundamentals.   
  
The lack of robustness in the empirical literature suggests that if intervention does indeed 
operate through a general expectations channel, monetary authorities do not always possess an 
information advantage over the market.  Large interventions, especially those undertaken in 
concert with other central banks, seem more likely to affect exchange rates in the desired 
direction than small, unilateral operations.  From an expectations perspective, large interventions 
may demonstrate a higher conviction on the part of the monetary authorities, in the same manner 
that a speculator who is very certain about his or her private information will take a larger 
position in the market.  Coordinated interventions suggest that more than one monetary authority 
shares a particular view about the market.   
Somewhat more controversial is the relative importance of secrecy to an intervention’s 
effectiveness.  Prior to the late 1970s, the System usually operated covertly, as we discuss in 
chapter 5.  Thereafter, the System usually operated openly.  Given that intervention often 
operates through an expectations channel, secrecy may seem counterproductive, but 
Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) and Vitale (1999) present theoretical models in which secrecy 
contributes to an intervention’s success.  Dominguez and Frankel (1993a), Hung (1997), Chiu 
(2003), and Beine and Bernail (2008) also discuss various reasons for maintaining secrecy.   11 
 
In the end, however, if sterilized intervention does not affect market fundamentals, it does 
not afford monetary authorities a means of routinely guiding their exchange rates along a path 
that they determine independent of their monetary policies.  It can instead conflict with monetary 
policy.  That, we argue, is why the Federal Reserve stopped intervening.   
The Mechanics of U.S. Intervention 
  In the United States both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have separate 
legal authority for intervention, but the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 made the Treasury first among 
equals in this arrangement.  The Treasury and the Federal Reserve always have coordinated their 
operations and, depending on their exact nature, often have acted in close concert.  Since 1980, 
for example, each agency usually has financed an equal share of every intervention operation.  
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York executes all foreign exchange transactions for both 
accounts.   
At various times over the years, each agency has lobbied the other for or against initiating 
an intervention, depending on its individual assessment of the operation’s overall appropriateness 
and its likelihood for success.  At times, the Treasury has basically delegated intervention 
operations completely to the System, and at other times the Treasury has closely monitored and 
controlled minor details of the operations (Task Force Paper #6, 1990, p. 12.)  In any event, the 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve have always ironed out differences over the operating 
strategies and the best techniques to follow (Task Force Paper #6 1990. p. 14).  The Federal 
Reserve, however, has never intervened for its own account without the Treasury’s authorization, 
and the Treasury, presumably, cannot direct the System to intervene for its own account against 
the latter’s will.  Still, the Federal Reserve has at times unwillingly participated in Treasury 
initiated interventions because appearing not to cooperate in a legitimate policy action of the 
administration would raise market uncertainty and could sabotage the operation’s chances for 
success.  Congress has repeatedly cautioned that the System should conform to the Treasury’s 
foreign financial policies (Task Force Paper #6 1990).  Ultimately, in the mid-1990s, however, 
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) stopped intervening with the tacit approval of the 
Treasury because it feared that intervention—especially when directed by the Treasury—
threatened its independence and weakened the credibility of U.S. monetary policy.   
Exchange Stabilization Fund 
12
The Treasury conducts intervention through the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), 
which Congress established, at the urging of the Roosevelt administration, under the Gold Act of 
1934 (Schwartz 1997, Osterberg and Thomson 1999).
 
13  The ESF’s primary objective was to 
stabilize the exchange value of the dollar by buying or selling foreign currencies and gold.  In 
addition to foreign-exchange intervention, the ESF has provided temporary stabilization loans to 
select developing countries.  Most of these have been Latin American countries, with Mexico 
being the most persistent recipient.  While these operations conform broadly to the ESF’s 
directive of stabilizing dollar exchange rates—many of these countries pegged their currencies to 
the dollar—the recipients need not use these funds directly in their exchange markets.  Some, for 
example, have dressed up their foreign exchange reserves on reporting dates.  Consequently, the 
loans often have a distinct foreign-aid and foreign-policy flavor.
14
Congress initially capitalized the Fund with $2.0 billion acquired from the devaluation of 
the dollar against gold, but later used $1.8 billion of the ESFs funds to make an initial quota 
payment to the IMF.
   
15  Besides its initial capitalization, Congress allowed the ESF to retain all of 12 
 
the earnings from its operations and to remain outside of the annual appropriations process.  
Doing so guarded the agency’s secrecy, a precious commodity when attempting to stabilize 
exchange rates.  In a like vein, Congress gave the Secretary of the Treasury—who ultimately 
reports to the U.S. President—exclusive control over ESF operations.  The Secretary’s decisions 
are final and not subject to the review of any other officer of the U.S. government.
16
Still the ESF’s ability to expand its balance sheet is fairly inelastic.  Its capacity to 
acquire foreign exchange through intervention or to extend loans is limited by the amount of 
dollar denominated assets in its portfolio.  Absent a Congressional appropriation, the ESF can 
acquire additional dollars through two mechanisms:  First, the Fund can monetize Special 
Drawing Rights (SDRs) with the Federal Reserve System.  With the authorization of the 
Treasury Secretary, the ESF creates “SDR certificates” a liability on its balance sheet, and sells 
them to the Federal Reserve, which is legally obliged to accept them.  The ESF can also obtain 
dollars by warehousing foreign exchange with the Federal Reserve.  Warehousing is a currency 
swap in which the Federal Reserve buys foreign currency from the ESF in a spot transaction and 
immediately sells it back—typically for delivery within 12 months—in a forward transaction.  
The Treasury has also at times augmented the ESF’s foreign-currency reserves directly by 
issuing foreign-currency-denominated securities—Roosa and Carter bonds.  The Treasury can 
also draw on the U.S. quota with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and turn the proceeds 
over to the ESF.  Still, the ESF’s balance sheet is inelastic.  The need to quickly augment the 
ESF’s resources in the early 1960s, was a key reason that the Federal Reserve decided to 
participate in U.S. foreign exchange operations, as chapter 4 explains.   
  Responding 
quickly is also essential for successful foreign-exchange operations.   
The Federal Reserve System  
  The FOMC has derived its legal authority for intervention from various sections of the 
Federal Reserve Act (see chapter 4).  Under this authority, Federal Reserve Banks—chiefly the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York—first undertook some limited exchange-market operation 
during World War I and extended stabilization credits to European central banks in the mid-
1920s (see chapter 2).  These operations were controversial, and Congress amended the Federal 
Reserve Act in 1933 to prevent Federal Reserve Banks from operating without the Board of 
Governor’s direct oversight (Task Force Paper #2, p. 2).  After a long hiatus, the System re-
established its own portfolio of foreign-exchange in 1962 and began intervening to forestall gold 
losses and to stabilize the dollar.  The System remained a fairly active participant in the foreign-
exchange market from 1962 through the mid 1990s.  Since 1995, it has intervened on only four 
occasions, but it maintains a portfolio of foreign exchange for that purpose.  Although some 
FOMC participants argued that the System lacked clear legal authority for intervention after 
1933, Congress has never attempted to prevent the System’s activities in the foreign-exchange 
market.  The FOMC, moreover, interprets Congress’s passage of the Monetary Control Act of 
1980, which expanded the System’s authority for investing its foreign-exchange portfolio, as 
tacit Congressional recognition of the System’s authority for foreign-exchange operations.   
  Within the Federal Reserve System, the FOMC maintains authority over intervention 
operations because intervention involves a type of open-market transaction.  A subcommittee 
consisting of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the FOMC, the Vice-Chairman of the Board 
of Governors, and one other member of the Board of Governor, who the Chairman appoints and 
who has responsibility for international matters, is accountable for intervention decisions when 
the full FOMC is not immediately available to render vital judgments.   13 
 
  The FOMC’s guidelines for intervention operations consist of three documents:  The 
Authorization for Foreign Currency Operations sanctions the System’s purchases of foreign 
exchange, permits holding of specific foreign-currency balances and establishes overall limits on 
the System’s net-open position—its foreign-exchange exposure.  The Foreign Currency 
Directive focuses more on the objectives of intervention and on the manner in which the Desk at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York should undertake foreign-exchange transactions.  The 
Procedural Instructions clarify the relationship among the FOMC, the Foreign Exchange 
Subcommittee, and the Manager of the Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  From 
time to time, the FOMC established informal agreements, such as limits on the amounts of 
intervention the Desk can take in specific currencies.   
  The System—in stark contrast to the ESF—finances its purchases of foreign exchange by 
creating reserves.  Consequently, its capacity to acquire foreign exchange is ultimately limited 
only by the FOMC’s willingness to acquire foreign-exchange risk.  The System finances sales of 
foreign exchange either from its portfolio of foreign exchange assets or via its capacity to borrow 
or buy foreign exchange from other central banks or from the U.S. Treasury.  As noted, the 
System undertakes intervention “in close and continuous consultation and cooperation with the 
United States Treasury” (Task Force Paper #6 p. 1).   
  The U.S. also closely coordinates its intervention operations with foreign central banks.  
In the broad sense, this means that the United States seeks permission to buy and sell a particular 
foreign currency from the issuing central bank.  More narrowly, however, the U.S. and the 
relevant foreign central bank have often operated in concert both to signal agreement with the 
operation’s objectives and to increase the amount of intervention.   
  The oft-stated objective of U.S. foreign exchange operations is to counter disorderly 
market conditions—a very amorphous concept.  Greene (#129 August 1984, pp. 12-13) 
described the Desk’s perception of market disorder:   
“In making judgments about conditions in the exchange market and the need for 
orderly market intervention, U.S. authorities considered many dimensions of 
trading.  They evaluated the variability of the exchange rate itself as indicated, for 
example, by the magnitude and speed of rate changes within a day, day to day, 
cumulatively over several days or longer, and relative to perceived or known 
changes in the underlying economic fundamentals.  They also evaluated market 
participants’ perceptions of the risk of dealing as indicated, for instance, by the 
width of bid-asked spreads, the existence of large gaps between successive rate 
quotations, or an unwillingness on the part of market professionals to take 
currency into position even temporarily and thereby cushion the impact on the 
market of their customers’ currency needs.”   
To be sure, market disorder is largely in the eyes of the beholder (see chapter 5).   
Swap Lines 
  Both the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve have from time-to-time set up swap lines 
as a means of either acquiring foreign exchange or as a method of supplying dollar reserves 
temporarily to a foreign government or central bank in need of dollars.  In a swap, the United 
States and a foreign government exchange currencies spot and simultaneously reverse the 
transaction at a known forward exchange rate on a specific date in the future.  The System 14 
 
maintained an extensive network of swap lines during the 1960s and 1970s and commonly relied 
on them for intervention purposes.  Use of swap lines to finance intervention dropped off by the 
early 1980s, and the System has since used them only as a vehicle for making temporary 
stabilization loans to countries.  Today, the System maintains only two ongoing swap lines with 
Canada and Mexico as part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but during 
the recent global financial crisis the System extended a network of temporary liquidity swap 
lines to developed and developing countries so that these countries could quickly offer dollar 
liquidity to their commercial banks (see epilogue).   
  As noted warehousing refers to a swap transaction between the U.S. Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve System in which the System temporarily acquires foreign exchange from the 
Treasury and the Treasury acquires dollars from the Federal Reserve.  Once the loan is extended, 
the System has absolutely no control over how the Treasury uses the funds.  Warehousing is 
controversial because it resembles a temporary collateralized loan from the System to the ESF, 
outside of the Congressional appropriations process (see chapters 5 and 6).  FOMC members 
have worried that such loans could impede the System’s independence and its monetary policy 
credibility.   
Investments & Profits 
  Prior to 1980, the United States did not hold large balances of foreign exchange.  
Moreover, its foreign-exchange liabilities (swap drawings, Roosa and Carter bonds, or IMF 
drawings) exceeded its foreign-exchange assets, giving the System a small negative net-open 
position.  The decision in the early 1980s to expand its portfolio and to hold an open position in 
foreign exchange stemmed from concerns that foreign governments could place conditions on 
the System’s ability to borrow foreign exchange and that these conditions could delay or 
otherwise hamper U.S. intervention operations (see chapter 5).  After 1980, the System acquired 
a substantial net-open position in foreign exchange and a corresponding exposure to exchange-
rate-revaluation risk.  At the end of 2010, U.S. monetary authorities held nearly $52 billion 
equivalent in foreign-exchange reserves split equally between the Federal Reserve System’s and 
the U.S. Treasury’s accounts.  Each portfolio contains slightly more euro assets (55%) than yen 
assets (45%).   
  Outside of small working balances, the United States currently holds its foreign exchange 
in highly liquid and safe interest-earning assets.  Prior to 1980, the System invested its foreign 
exchange holdings in deposit accounts with foreign central banks, some of whom could not 
legally pay interest on the balances, or with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).  When 
interest was available, the underlying rates were generally administered rates—discount or other 
policy rates—or set by swap arrangements.  Safe and liquid alternatives were often not available.  
The Monetary Control Act allowed the System to earn a higher (market-related) rate of return on 
its balance by investing them in the obligations of foreign governments and official institutions 
(see Task Force Paper #8 1990).   
  The System earns profits and losses on its portfolio—a realized profit or loss when the 
Desk sells foreign exchange from the portfolio and an unrealized profit or loss each month when 
it marks the portfolio to market.  When the Federal Reserve buys or sells foreign exchange, 
whether for its own account or for the ESF’s account, it books the transactions at current 
exchange rates.  Foreign-currency-denominated interest receipts on the account are treated 
similarly.  Over time, the System books increments to the portfolio at different exchange rates.  15 
 
When it calculates the profit or loss associated with a subsequent foreign exchange sale, the Desk 
must decide which of the exchange rates used to book the foreign-exchange acquisitions is the 
appropriate base for the transaction.  The choice can make a substantial difference to the profit 
calculation when exchange rates fluctuate day-to-day.   
  The System resolves this problem by using a weighted-average exchange rate based on 
the entire portfolio.  This rate equals the cumulative book value in a particular foreign currency 
divided by its cumulative book value in dollars.  Realized profits compare the exchange rate at 
which currency is sold to this weighted average rate.  The Fed also calculates the valuation, or 
unrealized profits, on the entire portfolio using an end of month exchange rate and compares this 
valuation with the aforementioned weighted average.  Essentially, this reveals the profits from 
selling off the entire portfolio at a particular time.  On this basis, the System has generally 
profited (realized and unrealized) from intervention, but not always.  Between 1979 and 1997, 
the years for which data are readily available, these profits were small, but their year-to-year 
variance has been large (see figure 1).
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During the Bretton Woods era, 1962 through 1971, exchange rates did not change much, 
the gold price remained fixed, and many of the mechanisms used for interventions—swap lines 
and Roosa bonds—contained protections against exchange-rate changes.  Interest-rate 
differentials were largely inconsequential to profit calculations.  Consequently, the United 
States’ relatively small exposures did not generate large profits or losses (Task Force Paper #10, 
1990. pp.14-19).   
   
  The closing of the gold window on 15 August 1971 meant that the United States could 
not sell gold to meet outstanding foreign-currency obligations, and had to look for an alternative 
means of repaying the debt.  The United States had nearly $5 billion in outstanding obligations, 
primarily in Swiss francs, British pounds, Belgian francs, and German marks.  Estimates of the 
profit or loss associated with repayment range widely from a loss of about $2½ billion to a small 
gain, depending on the counterfactual assumptions that one makes about the Treasury’s ability to 
sell gold (Task Force Paper #10 1990, pp. 24 – 27).   
  While the Federal Reserve, out of its fiduciary responsibility to Congress and the 
American people, hopes to avoid losses on its foreign-exchange portfolio, a desire for profits has 
never motivated U.S. intervention operations.  As noted, the Desk intervenes to calm market 
disorder.  In holding a net open position in foreign exchange, however, the System and the U.S. 
Treasury are acting much like speculators, and they earn profits or incur losses at the expense of 
the private sector.  If, for example, the System acquires Japanese yen through its market 
interventions, and the yen subsequently appreciates against the dollar, the System’s net worth 
rises while the private sector’s net worth falls relative to what it would have been in the absence 
of the intervention (Task Force Paper #10 1990, p. 6 -7).  This has implications for market 
efficiency.   
Friedman (1953) suggested that profits contained information about the effectiveness of 
official interventions.  Destabilizing foreign-exchange speculators necessarily incur losses that 
quickly drive them from the market.
18  Only stabilizing speculators remain in the market.  He 
warned, however, that central banks do not face hard budget constraints and, therefore, could 
undertake more persistent unprofitable and destabilizing transactions.  Subsequent work, 
however, indicated that Friedman’s correspondence between profitable and stabilizing 
speculation need not hold, especially if the underlying equilibrium exchange rate is not constant.  16 
 
Profitable intervention can sometimes be destabilizing, and unprofitable intervention can 
sometimes be stabilizing (Task Force Paper #10, p. 2).  Consequently, one cannot infer much 
about the ability of central banks to stabilize exchange rates from the profitability of the foreign-
exchange operations.   
  Perhaps the most interesting way to think about central-bank profits, particular valuation 
gains or losses, is in terms of their connection to profits or losses generated in the private market.  
A substantial number of studies, for example, have found that fairly simple technical trading 
rules—including ex ante rules, as in Neely, Weller, and Ditmar (1997)—generate profits that are 
difficult to explain in terms of standard risk measures.
19
Quite a few studies have shown that technical trading rules generate excess returns during 
periods of central-bank intervention.  This seems especially likely if central banks adopt a 
“leaning-against-the-wind” intervention strategy.  If central banks slow, but do not reverse, 
exchange rate movements, they will inevitably sustain valuation losses, at least in the short-run.  
By taking a position opposite that of the central bank, technical traders apparently stand to profit.  
In contrast to these findings, however, many other studies conclude that central banks have 
earned small profits from their intervention operations since the collapse of Bretton Woods.   
  Recent surveys suggest that technical 
trading rules seem to account for a large segment of foreign-exchange trading.   
Neeley (1998) reconciles the technical trading results with the apparent overall 
profitability of intervention by showing that intervention profits occur over a longer time horizon 
than technical trading profits.  In the short-run, intervention often generates losses, a point that 
Goodhart and Hesse (1993) also illustrate.  Hence, it is possible that technical traders profit 
against the central bank in the short-run while central banks profit in the long-term.  This raises 




   
  This chapter has presented background material on foreign-exchange intervention and on 
the U.S. institutional framework for that intervention.  The remainder of this books explains how 
theories of intervention and institutional arrangements evolved in the United States during the 
twentieth century.  The key concern is how these developments interacted with monetary policy.   
  As chapter 2 explains, the roots of modern foreign-exchange-market operations are 
found in the classical gold standard, but they quickly grew and developed after World War I as 
countries first attempted to return to the gold standard and then reacted to the Great Depression.  
The chapter starts by explaining the development of private firms that specialize in the spatial 
and temporal arbitrage of sterling bills and related instruments.  The Second Bank of the United 
States under Nicholas Biddle extended these operations, buying and selling foreign exchange to 
stabilize exchange rates and to insulate the domestic economy from external shocks.  Biddle 
conducted foreign-exchange-market intervention or, at least, a prototype of it.  The Civil War 
saw the issuance of Greenbacks and floating exchange rates.  After the war, the Treasury 
contracted the money supply to return to the gold standard and avoided exchange-market 
operations until World War I.  Both the issuance of Greenbacks and the return to the gold 
standard were decisions on how to deal with the trilemma.   
In 1914, Congress established the Federal Reserve System and gave it powers consistent 
with foreign-exchange operations.  World War I turned the potential for such operations into an 17 
 
actuality.  As chapter 2 shows, by the end of the war, the machinery for future exchange-market 
operations was clearly in place.  With the war as a precedent, the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York participated in a number of stabilization programs for other countries and engaged in 
several direct foreign-exchange-market interventions during the 1920s and early 1930s.   As the 
chapter also illustrates, these operations saw the beginnings of central-bank cooperation in gold 
and foreign-exchange operations, which would become the hallmark of Bretton Woods and, 
later, the Plaza and Louvre accords.  The object of most of the activities in the 1920s and 1930s 
was to preserve the gold standard—a pillar of monetary stability and a solution to the trilemma.    
  The antecedents of U.S. exchange market operations are also found in the European 
experience.  Chapter 2 explains how European central banks under the classical gold standard 
often bent the “rules of the game” through discount policies and gold devices.  These were early 
exchange-market operations.  Some European central banks held foreign exchange reserves and 
stabilized their exchange rates within the gold points through intervention.  The chapter 
illustrates early uses of secrecy, sterilization, and forward transactions—all of which become 
important characteristics of modern interventions.  The chapter ends with the establishment of 
the British Exchange Equalization Fund, which directly intervened in the foreign-exchange 
market.  The Exchange Equalization Fund was the direct precursor of the U.S. Exchange 
Stabilization Fund.   
  President Roosevelt believed that Britain devalued the pound and established the 
Exchange Equalization Fund for protectionist purposes.  As a countermove, he devalued the 
dollar and established the Exchange Stabilization Fund in January 1934.  Chapter 3 chronicles 
its establishment, its structure and its operations from its inception through 1961.  The Exchange 
Stabilization Fund (ESF), which is the primary vehicle for foreign-exchange-market intervention 
in the United States, has a structure conducive to intervention, but one that is unlike most other 
government agencies:  It is under exclusive control of the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury whose 
decisions, aside from the approval of the President, cannot be reviewed by any other officer of 
the United States.  In addition, the ESF has always been self financing, meaning outside of the 
Congressional appropriations process.   
The ESF first intervened in dollars and gold against French francs, British pounds, 
Belgian francs and Netherlands guilder.  Chapter 3 explains these early operations, including 
the ESF’s interactions with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, private commercial banks, 
and foreign central banks.  Information about many of the transactions during the 1930s, 
including data on their dollar amounts come from William Brown’s (1942) rare, unpublished 
manuscript.  In addition, chapter 3 draws on newly available material from the Morganthau 
Diaries to construct the narrative.    
In 1936, Britain, France, and United States signed the Tripartite Agreement—a 
cooperative effort to stabilize exchange rates through intervention in gold and foreign exchange.  
(Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland also accepted the principles of the Tripartite 
Agreement.)  The Tripartite Agreement enabled France to devalue the franc without foreign 
offsets and re-established mechanisms for gold settlements.  (Belgium also soon devalued.)  
Intervention in currency and gold—mostly the latter—occurred through 1939 with the objective 
of stabilizing exchange rates.  While the Tripartite intervention between 1934 and the outbreak 
of World War II may have helped stabilize short-term exchange-rate movements, it did not 
address the fundamental misalignment among key currencies.  The Tripartite Agreement did not 18 
 
solve the trilemma.  World War II with its exchange controls and disruptions ended the Great 
Depression and the problems that it posed for exchange markets in the 1930.   
  Because the ESF holds substantial assets, is self financing, and is solely under the 
direction of the Treasury, it can also undertake myriad operations only tangentially related to its 
original objective.  Chapter 3 explains three such operations of the ESF:  First, the ESF has 
often made loans to developing countries, especially Mexico and other Latin American nations.  
Second, under the Silver Purchase Act of 1934, the ESF purchased silver and lifted its price.  It, 
therefore, intervened in the silver market.  Third, the ESF had authority to invest in government 
securities and, therefore, potentially interfere with monetary policy.   
  Chapter 4 discusses U.S. foreign exchange operations during the Bretton Woods era.  
Bretton Woods—established in 1944—became fully functional in 1958 when key European 
countries made their currencies convertible for current-account transactions.  At roughly the 
same time, however, fundamental problems with Bretton Woods began to appear.  By 1961, the 
total external dollar liabilities of the United States exceeded the U.S. gold stock, implying that 
the United States could not fulfill its commitment to exchange dollars for gold at $35 per ounce.  
This development encouraged central banks to convert unwanted dollars for gold, heightened 
uncertainty about the exchange rates, and fostered speculation.  A rising U.S. inflation rate in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s only aggravated the situation.   
In an attempt to protect the U.S. gold stock and to neutralize speculative activities, the 
U.S. Treasury began intervening in 1961—after a 30-year hiatus—and the Federal Reserve 
System joined a year later after an important and controversial debate about its legal authority to 
do so.  As illustrated in chapter 4, the United States undertook various types of operations.   The 
Treasury and Federal Reserve cooperated closely, but a clear division of labor emerged.  The 
Federal Reserve formed the first line of defense primarily through its Reciprocal Currency 
Arrangements or swap lines—a key focus of the chapter.  The swap lines provide central banks 
of surplus countries with cover for their temporary acquisitions of unwanted dollars and offered 
the central banks of deficit countries dollar liquidity to defend their pegs.  The U.S. Treasury, 
with its clearer authority for intervention, focused on longer-term operations.  If, for example, 
market conditions prevented the System from acquiring enough foreign exchange to reverse a 
swap drawing, the Treasury could acquire the necessary foreign exchange by issuing foreign-
currency-denominated securities, drawing foreign exchange from the IMF, or selling gold.   
U.S. foreign-exchange-market operations from 1961 through 1973 may have successfully 
delayed the disintegration of the Bretton Woods system, but by allowing monetary authorities to 
postpone more fundamental and necessary adjustments, they only delayed the inevitable.  
Bretton Woods ultimately failed because countries would not subvert their domestic economic 
objectives to the maintenance of fixed exchange rates.  Floating rates offered a viable solution to 
the trilemma.   
Still, monetary authorities would not allow exchange rates free reign, as chapter 5 
explains.  During the early float period (1973 – 1981), policy makers viewed exchange markets 
as inherently prone to bouts of disorder in which information imperfections caused exchange 
rates to deviate from their fundamental values, fostered excessive volatility, and encouraged 
destabilizing speculation.  Intervention, particularly on the part of the United States, was 
necessary to maintain order.  U.S. policy makers, however, never clearly articulated the 
transmission mechanism through which intervention worked.  Early on, economists viewed 19 
 
intervention as affecting exchange rates through a portfolio-balance mechanism, which, if true, 
would indeed give policy makers an additional instrument through which to affect exchange 
rates without sacrificing their domestic monetary-policy objectives.  Oddly, the Foreign 
Exchange Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York did not seem to espouse this view.  
They described intervention as having a vague “psychological” impact on exchange markets, 
which came about because the Desk demonstrated concern for the dollar.   
Between 1973 and 1981, as chapter 5 details, the Desk operated on both sides of the 
market, but the transactions were usually of two types.  Typically, the Desk sold foreign 
exchange, which it acquired through swap drawings, to offset the dollar’s depreciation—active 
intervention.  Because the operations were financed through swap drawing, the Desk then 
quickly looked for opportunities to buy back the dollars and to repay the swaps—passive 
intervention.  In 1977, the dollar began to depreciate sharply as confidence in the United States’ 
willingness to deal decisively with inflation was rapidly evaporating.  Over the next two years, 
U.S. intervention operations increased in amount, frequency, and openness.   
The record of U.S. operations between 1973 and 1981were at best equivocal.  During 
nearly every operation, the dollar continued to depreciate, but the United States typically sought 
only to moderate the dollar’s depreciation, not reverse it.  On this score, we find some limited 
evidence of success.  Nevertheless, only after the United States changed monetary policy on 6 
October 1979 and convinced markets that it would pursue disinflation despite a recession and 
rising unemployment, did the dollar start to strengthen.  Intervention’s lackluster record during 
the early float led the Reagan administration to quickly adopt a minimalist approach in 1981.   
By the late 1970s, foreign central banks—impatient with the U.S. response to inflation—
threatened to apply conditions on continued swap drawings.  Largely in response, as chapter 5 
explains, the FOMC began to increase its portfolio of foreign exchange reserves when the dollar 
began to stabilize.  Although the System continued to maintain its swap network with foreign 
central banks for the time being, drawings on the lines would shortly end.  In contrast, the 
System’s swap lines with the U.S. Treasury—its warehousing facility—continued and grew.  
Chapter 5 also looks backward to explain the evolution of warehousing through 1981.      
Chapter 6 discusses intervention during the Volcker and Greenspan eras.  By the early 
1980s, most economists concluded that intervention did not work through a portfolio-balance 
channel.  The Jurgensen Report—multinational pronouncement about intervention’s 
effectiveness—suggested that if intervention were to have anything other than a fleeting, hit-or-
miss effect on exchange rates, monetary policy had to support it.  The view of intervention as a 
signal of future monetary policy had already emerged, but this implied that intervention did not 
provide a means of affecting exchange rates independent of monetary policy.  Consequently, 
intervention could not solve the trilemma.   
  The dollar appreciated sharply on both a nominal and a real basis between 1980 and early 
1985 under tight monetary and lose fiscal policies.  Facing pressure from U.S. manufacturers, 
Congress, and some academic economists, the administration abandoned its minimalist strategy.  
Coordinated interventions, highlighted by the Plaza and Louvre accords, followed.  Many 
analysts regard this period as clear support for concerted foreign-exchange operations and 
macroeconomic policy coordination, but the narrative and statistical evidence in chapter 6 are 
less supportive.   20 
 
  A lack of unequivocal statistical support for intervention was never key to its demise.  
The FOMC stopped intervening primarily because FOMC participants believed that intervention, 
and the institutional arrangements associated with it, undermined their ability to establish and to 
maintain a credible commitment to price stability.   By the late 1980s and very early 1990s, the 
FOMC was maintaining a tight monetary policy, but the Desk was buying massive amounts of 
foreign exchange generally under the Treasury’s direction.  The two operations were 
contradictory, and the latter undermined the former.  That the Desk sterilized the intervention did 
not matter.  As chapter 6 explains, the FOMC’s objections were three-fold:  First, while legally 
independent, the System had little choice but to participate with the Treasury in major foreign-
exchange operations.  This undermined the System’s independence.  Second, FOMC 
participants—recalling the Jurgensen Report—feared that if markets interpreted sterilized 
intervention as a signal of future monetary-policy change, intervention created uncertainty about 
the System’s commitment to price stability.  Third, losses on its now substantial portfolio of 
foreign exchange and large commitments to warehouse funds for the Treasury could result in 
Congressional policies that might impinge on System’s independence.    
Our conclusion, chapter 7, summarizes our main argument.  Official attitudes about 
intervention and monetary policy evolved in tandem.  Ultimately, frequent intervention ended 
because it did not offer a way around the trilemma.  It did not offer monetary authorities an 
independent instrument with which to pursue an additional policy goal.  Instead, intervention and 
the associated institutions weakened the System’s credibility for price stability.   
The United States essentially stopped intervening by the mid-1990s, but U.S. policy 
makers never dismissed intervention as completely ineffectual.  Since then, the System has 
intervened on three occasions:  on 17 June 1997, the System purchased $833 million worth of 
Japanese yen in concert with the Japanese Ministry of Finance; on 22 September 2000, the 
System bought $1.3 billion equivalent euros in concert with the European Central Bank, and on 
17 March 2011, the United States intervened in concert with the Japanese Ministry of Finance 
and other governments to buy yen following Japan’s earthquake and tsunami.  Our epilogue 
briefly discusses modern intervention operations in Japan, and Switzerland and among many 
emerging market and developing countries.  We also explain the use of swap lines during the 
recent financial crisis.   
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1  Useful surveys of the theoretical underpinnings and empirical effectiveness of foreign-
exchange-market intervention include:  Edison (1993), Alkeminders (1995), Baillie et.al. (2000), 
Sarno and Taylor (2001).  Surveys of central banks’ views are found in Neely (2001, 2007) and 
LeCourt and Raymond (2006), and surveys of market participants’ views are found in Chueng 
and Chinn (2001).  Neely (2005) also considers some econometric issues.  Almekinders and 
Eijffinger (1996) and Baillie and Osterberg (1997) focus on reaction functions.  While this book 
does not consider intervention among emerging and developing countries, the BIS (2005) and 
Ishii (2006) contain surveys of that topic.    
Endnotes 
2  For a basic statement of the trilemma see Feenstra and Taylor (2008, p. 585-587).   
3  Central banks will occasionally time these transactions to maximize or minimize their 
influence on exchange rates.  In such circumstances, these commercial or customer transactions 
constitute a type of “passive intervention,” as Adams and Henderson (1983) first described.   
4  For small advanced countries with relatively thin domestic securities markets, like 
Switzerland, the purchase of foreign exchange might offer a mechanism through which to 
conduct a quantitative-easing-type of monetary policy. 
5  The portfolio balance mechanism also assumes that no restrictions exist on cross-border 
financial flows and that Ricardian-equivalence does not hold.   
6  Many models and empirical applications assume that relative changes in the stock of securities 
leave interest rates unaffected because monetary policy determines interest rates.  Nevertheless, 
interest rates can be part of the adjustment process.    
7  Consider also the voluminous literature on Taylor Rules.   
8  As chapter five explains, the 1983 Jurgensen Report concluded that intervention was most 
likely to be effective if backed up with the appropriate change in monetary policy.  We show in 
chapter six that during the 1990s, FOMC participants—often referring to the Jurgensen Report—
complained that interventions, which at the time often proved incompatible with the thrust of 
monetary policy, weakened the System’s credibility and threatened its independence.   
9  See Chapter 5.   
10  See: Taylor (2005), Reitz and Taylor (2008), and Sarno and Taylor (2001).   
11  Cheung and Chinn (2001, pp. 462 - 464) report that traders are about evenly split on a positive 
or negative assessment of intervention.  Traders also suggest that intervention increases 
exchange-rate volatility, but a higher volatility can be consistent with market efficiency.  Neely 
(2001, 2007) and LeCourt and Raymond (2006) report that central banks believe that 
intervention is effective.   
12  This section draws on Schwartz (1997).  See also:  Henning (2008), and Osterberg and 
Thomson (1999).   
13  Chapter 3 details the establishment of the ESF.   27 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
14  In 1988 and 1990, for example, the ESF made temporary stabilization loans to Yugoslavia and 
to Hungary, respectively, whose currencies were of little economic importance to the United 
States, but the loans fostered foreign-policy objectives.   
15  In 1934, the Roosevelt administration raised the official gold prices—devalued the dollar—
from $20.67 per ounce to $35 per ounce.   
16  Since the late 1970s, Congress has imposed some oversight on operations and on the 
financing of the ESF, but these are largely after-the-fact reporting requirements.  Fund operations 
remain squarely within the purview of the Treasury (see Henning 2008).   
17  Leahy (1995) and Task Force Paper #10 calculate profits using an alternative formula.  These 
profit estimates, unlike the official calculations, take explicit account of the opportunity costs of 
holding foreign exchange.  These calculations show that the United States has earned an overall 
cumulative profit on its accounts, that the United States has sometimes incurred losses on the 
accounts, and that the variability of the returns on the portfolio has risen with the portfolio’s size.   
18  Friedman’s criterion considers only valuation gains and losses; it abstracts from any net 
interest earnings.   
19  Osler 1998 suggests that more elaborate trading rules, specifically head-and-shoulders rules, 
largely mimic much simpler rules.   
20  The relationships among intervention, profits, and the private sector factor into our narrative 
several times in chapters 4, 5, and 6.  Also, see the empirical appendix.   